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Feasibility, Necessity, and Rebellion of Collective Authenticity as Understood Through
Heidegger and Fanon
In section 74 of his work Being and Time, Martin Heidegger expands on the theme of
authenticity in a notable and perhaps unusual way. He suggests that in order to fully come back
to an unrepressed ownership of its authenticity, Dasein must achieve authenticity in, with, and
for its co-historical community, the achievement of which is coined as a ‘destiny.’1 This section
is notable as Being and Time’s prior discussions regarding authenticity allude to the authenticity
of Dasein in a singular sense, not of multiple Dasein joined together in community. Furthermore,
considering that inauthenticity—the state from which Dasein’s authenticity must arise out of—is
rooted in Dasein’s fallenness to the they-ness of the others, one may question whether section
74’s concept of destiny and collective authenticity is a contradiction. Can Dasein escape
inauthentic fallenness to the ‘they’ and truly come to its authentic self if it must bring others
along on its escape attempt? Would maintaining such community be an instance of chaining
oneself to the ‘they’, i.e., another recurring instance of fallenness into inauthenticity? Are liberal
interpreters such as Salem-Wiseman correct in asserting that any external, non-individual
elements of a Dasein’s pursuit of authenticity always “entrench the dominion of das Man”?2
This paper aims to show that Dasein’s historical thrownness, rather than the individual
Dasein in itself, is what should be the main focus in regards to authenticity, and that once this
distinction is drawn, the achievement of a collective authenticity is both feasible and indeed what
follows Being and Time’s main line of argument on authenticity.3 These considerations will
1

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward S. Robinson (Victoria: Must Have Books,
2021), 434-439.
2
Jonathan Salem-Wiseman, “Heidegger’s Dasein and the Liberal Conception of the Self” Political Theory 31, no. 4.
(2003), 540, https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591703251146.
3
This is an important disclaimer that I encourage be read in its entirety. To responsibly write about Heidegger’s
philosophy, especially in relation to the topics that this paper takes on, I must note that in 1933, seven years after
writing Being and Time, Heidegger notoriously and heinously joined the Nazi party of the then German Reich. There
are a variety of contrasting accounts, interpretations, and affirmations amongst scholars on how this is to affect
contemporary studies, discussions, and considerations of Heideggarian philosophical texts such as Being and Time
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provide a rich support to the late W. S. K. Cameron’s belief in a compelling political relevance of
the early Heidegger, who noted, “He dismissed ethical and political questions as comparatively
trivial. Yet his ontology implies instructive insights for ethics and politics—not least, by
undermining the individualistic and voluntaristic assumptions of Western philosophy in general
and liberal political theory in particular”4.
Furthermore, this paper will also discuss how Frantz Fanon’s philosophy on race and
decolonization,5 particularly in his essay Racism and Culture and book The Wretched of the
Earth, resonates with the ideas of collective authenticity found in Heidegger’s Being and Time.
Considerations from Fanon will be used to both demonstrate how they-ness, inauthentic
fallenness, and collective authenticity are experienced in the historical context of colonialism, as
well as to clarify and develop the feasibility and necessity of collective authenticity itself. Fanon

that preceded this deplorable period of Heidegger’s life. Such discussion is considered in depth in Julian Young’s
book Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism, which this paper references. Nevertheless, the philosophy of Being and Time is
widely recognized as being immensely influential and fundamental to the development of further thought in the
contemporary tradition of continental philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, Latin American
philosophy, psychology, critical theories on race and gender, literature, and even architecture, that have had deep
impacts on shaping the 20th and 21st centuries as we know them. Because of this, the Heidegger and the philosophy
of Being and Time are still widely studied and considered in 21st century academic philosophy, including in the
philosophy department of Loyola Marymount University, which offered a course on Heidegger in the Fall semester
of 2021. With all things considered, I am ultimately in agreement with W. S. K. Cameron’s assessment in “Martin
Heidegger: Individual and Collective Responsibility” that, “Heidegger provides invaluable insights into the
possibilities and limits of insight and action— which together form the ground of the political [...] We simply cannot
afford to overlook this major, if sometimes misguided, thinker.” (239) and believe a careful analysis of such insights
in Being and Time can be both fruitful and responsible. Rather than deal directly with discussions that focus purely
on Heidegger and his Nazism, this paper is aimed at giving focus on how Frantz Fanon, a marginalized philosopher
of color, gives important philosophical additions to the philosophy of Being and Time that provide us a more refined,
full, and correct philosophy of authenticity that connects to concrete racial, cultural, and political realities. I believe
that these Fanonian supplements, especially in an extended version of this paper, contribute to a philosophy of
collective authenticity that is anti-Nazi.
4
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Fanon is more commonly discussed in relation to the French figures of 20th-century continental philosophy that he
was most directly influenced by and often in direct conversation with such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul
Sartre, the latter of which wrote the preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. The philosophy of such French
figures, however, is deeply influenced and indebted to Heidegger’s Being and Time, and as such, it should come as
no surprise for traces of Being and Time’s influence to be found in Fanon’s thought, even if they were not passed on
as directly.
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will also be particularly useful for discussing how certain groups become more marginalized than
others and why collective authenticity will necessarily elicit a provokation.
The Historical Thrownness of Dasein
To understand how collective authenticity is possible and non-contradictory, we first need
to specify what is being ‘authenticized’ when Dasein becomes authentic. To do this, we need to
understand the historicality and thrownness of Dasein. Heidegger emphasizes historicality, or the
possession of an active history, as a fundamental component of Dasein.6 Our history is something
that we are rooted in, something that our present selves come from. We all, for instance, have a
culture from which we come, a childhood and family structure (or lack thereof) from which we
evolved, the privileges or struggles of a socio-economic background that we have either
benefited from or cut our teeth upon, etc.
All these components of one’s history are things into which we are thrown. They are not
things which were chosen by Dasein. One never chooses or asks for their culture, their body,
their country of origin, or their race. As Young describes it, “Dasein never chooses, but finds
itself ‘already in a world.’”7 Such things, however, are inherited by us nonetheless and
manifested into one’s history. Thus, one’s history is always one that is constituted by thrownness.
This history that Dasein possesses, however, is never merely something that once was,
that is now over, and that we merely look back upon from time to time. Rather, it is something
historical, something that is still very much here with us today in our present lives.8 One’s
historical thrownness is not like an old sterile history book one can simply shelve away, detach
themselves from, and forget about. One cannot simply ditch their thrown history of racial,
6
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cultural, and social experiences that brought them to their present moment and act as though they
never happened. This is because that historical thrownness determines where we find ourselves
in that present moment and thus makes us who we are in that present moment. Our present
moments are always contextualized by some history of experience that brought us to that
moment. One is never void of such history.
Those historical experiences always shine a light on the world, deciding how it is
revealed in one’s present experience. For example, for one who has been historically thrown into
a racially colored experience in 21st century United States—a historicality in which people of
their racial group have been repeatedly exploited, harassed, and murdered by mobs and
authorities without justice or repercussions—the present world likely discloses itself as a place
viewed with a sense of deep caution, mistrust, fear, anger, and demands for actual justice. In an
experience of the present, the history into which we are thrown is always very much right there
alongside us.
In bringing us to the present, however, our historical thrownness also projects itself into
our future. As Young highlights, one’s historical thrownness discloses what is valuable to
Dasein, particularly when it comes to what kinds of activities and projects Dasein is intrinsically
and genuinely compelled to engage with in its life.9 The kind of lives that we want to live and the
things that we aim for in our futures, be it a job or profession that fascinates us, the continuation
of a family culture, a social issue that we want to commit ourselves to, or a kind of romantic
relationship that we crave, all stem from our past historical experiences that have led us to
develop values. Through this, our history is what opens up the visibility of a future to us. As
Heidegger affirms, it is something which discloses and regulates our possibilities for life and in
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this sense “is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes
ahead of it.”10
The fact that our history projects itself into our future does not mean, however, that our
futures are simply repeats of our past experiences. There can, of course, be historical experiences
that lead us to cherish and become intrinsically attached to a style of life, activity, culture, and/or
identity, and which subsequently lead us to value the continuation and growth of such ways of
life into the future. But there can also be others that lead us to feel a sense of emptiness, pain, or
injustice, in which case we desire to enact change to progress from and overcome such thrown
experience.
The overcoming of such voids and pains, however, occurs because one experiences,
holds, and recognizes them as their own histories for overcoming. If one fails or refuses to
recognize such history, and instead tries simply to ignore and pay no attention to what has
brought them to their present, overcoming such a void will be impossible. A triumph over
tragedy requires that the desire and will for triumph is projected out of that historical experience
of pain and emptiness itself. In being a triumph that is always related to the initial historical
experience, the triumph is ultimately united with the tragedy as a single united history of the
person that is further developed rather than abandoned.
Fanon demonstrates the importance of Dasein’s historicity in The Wretched of the Earth
when he discusses the importance of colonized poets and intellectuals whose work focuses on the
historicity of the pain, struggle, and injustice of their own marginalized experiences.11 The
emphasis of such work is not aimed at supporting mere intellectual acts. Nor does Fanon present
Guinean poetry with the aim of merely evoking deep sadness in a colonized person and making
10
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one feel as though they will never escape repeats of such pain, injustice, and tragedy. Rather, he
recognizes that the historical thrownness of the past manifested in these works allows a
colonized person to recognize their own experiences of alienation and marginalization in the
present moment, and that from that recognition, an orientation towards future political action that
overcomes such present subjugation is opened up to a colonized person for them pursue and with
which to liberate themselves.
This intrinsic value and will for one’s life pursuits always stems from similar projections
of our thrown experience. Dasein, our past, present, and future are all united by the historicity
that constitutes us as beings-in-time.
Authentication of Historical Thrownness
Heidegger maintains that Dasein ends up in a state of inauthenticity when, instead of
fully recognizing and owning its own history and the life that it is compelled to pursue as a
result, Dasein conforms to and falls for the affirmations, rules and expectations of averageness
and genericness asserted by the “tradition” of the “they,” which dismisses and covers up the
particular and unique historical thrownness that is Dasein’s legitimate source and origin.12 Fanon
demonstrates that such fallenness into inauthenticity is prominent amongst colonized people
who, in attempting to rescue themselves from further subjugation by conforming to the white
standards of they-ness under colonialism, attempt to deracialize themselves by walking away
from their own culture and customs which colonial they-ness condemns as primitive. Rather than
owning and pursuing their authentic selves and ways of life, such colonized people ‘fling’
themselves into adoptions of the cultural models that this they-ness affirms as acceptable
averageness.13
12
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The averageness that they-ness asserts always neglects and rolls over Dasein’s historical
thrownness because averageness and genericness never encompass the aspects of uniqueness and
particularity that make and distinguish Dasein as individuated by its distinct historicity. There is
always some experience of one’s historicity that is not a generic universal. In as much as one
always has such an aspect of uniqueness in what they are, the averageness of they-ness, in failing
to encompass that uniqueness that makes one who they truly are, will deny recognizing and
pursuing this part of ourselves.
However, fallenness to they-ness does not outright destroy one’s historicity. One’s
fallenness, in inauthentically rejecting their queerness in a homophobic society where
heterosexual and cis-gender standards are affirmed by they-ness as the appropriate tradition of
averageness, for example, does not outright destroy the identity, past experience, and attachment
with the experiences of gender and/or sexuality that they have been historically thrown into. A
history of something remains whether it is recognized or not, and as such, continues making the
person of the present that very thing. History cannot be erased, only covered up. As Young
articulates, “inauthentic Dasein actively represses its value-tradition and therefore remains in
possession of that tradition in the way in which, for Freudians, one remains in possession of
repressed, but not extinguished memories.”14 Because Dasein's history perseveres, albeit a
repressed perseverance, there is inevitably a dissonance between it and the averageness of
they-ness, a dissonance that Dasein necessarily experiences as a sense of uncanniness and
“not-at-homeness” when it is inauthentic. Being and Time affirms that this sensation is the call of
a Dasein’s conscience to come back to its authentic historical thrownness, and thus, to come back
to who it really is.15
14
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Fanon recognizes such conscience in the experience of the colonized, noting that
regardless of how much a colonized person attempts to deculturalize and deracialize itself so as
to conform to inauthenticity, they continue to experience racism and feelings of alienation.16 This
is in part because systematic exploitation against them continues regardless of how assimilated
they attempt to make themselves, but also because the culture they attempt to conform to is not
one derived from their own historical experiences. In such a position, they always retain an alien
outsider relationship to such culture. In the inevitable confrontation of such dissonance, from
their own people, communities, and childhood memories, there always remains a covered-up
authentic culture that derives from what the colonized has experienced in their historicity, one
that they can rediscover, revalorize, and recultivate.17
To become authentic is for inauthentic Dasein to hear this uncanny call of its conscience,
reestablish ownership of its own historical thrownness, and choose to pursue the future bound
values and possibilities that it has received from this historically thrown past. Thus, Dasein’s
historical thrownness, and its opening of authentic possibilities, is what is specifically being
revived and authenticized in an achievement of authenticity.
Historical Thrownness as Experienced by Multiple Subjects
While every Dasein has a history into which it is thrown, it would be wrong to take the
historicity of a Dasein as something that is rooted intrinsically and uniquely in the individual
Dasein. While a Nietzschean view might suggest that the individual can uniquely decide and
create the value that guides them independently within themselves, Heidegger’s conception of
historicity, as Young notes, views history not as something crafted by Dasein itself, but received
16
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and inherited externally.18 The historicity of Dasein would not be one of thrownness if it were
something it itself created and decided on. The aspects that constitute such a history are external
to and beyond Dasein, and because of this, have the capacity to be received and inherited by
others as well. Thus, what we are made of in terms of our history is never anything that is
fundamentally exclusive to us as individuals. The rest of the ‘herd’ may also have been thrown
into such historicity. Dasein can indeed find others who share that experience and historicity and
thus have their world disclosed in that same way.
McMullin gives further support for the potential of one’s historicity to be experienced by
others, noting Heidegger’s claim that for all things and experiences that are at hand for Dasein,
there is embedded a fundamental reference to “other wearers,” of others that could have gone
through the same experience.19 That is, whenever one is thrown into an experience, be it of
suffering as a terminal cancer patient, enjoying the extravagance of being an outdated British
royal, or being a member of Tibetan culture, they intuitively recognize the experience as
something that another could have been thrown into and experienced. Dasein understands in all
these experiences that someone else could have been standing in their shoes and experienced
such a thrown pain, splendor, or Tibetenness. Such an understanding is embedded within the
experience of these things themselves. It is the very reason why Dasein are compelled to express
and describe such experiences to others who did not directly experience such things, be it
through literature, art, or verbal conversation. It is also the reason why Dasein are able to
recognize and experience a sense of resonation with others that were also in the shoes of such an
experience. Thus, this intuitive awareness of other wearers further demonstrates historical

18
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thrownness as an ultimately independent and externally derived experience that can be shared
with others.20
What Constitutes a ‘People’ in Heidegger and Fanon
This important point about Dasein’s historicity is likely why Heidegger begins coining it
as a heritage of Dasein in section 74, as heritage more directly implies the existence of a
community of multiple Dasein that are partaking in and thus sharing the heritage experience.21
The use of heritage seems to emphasize that what is found within the individual in terms of its
historicity is also present in a community that was thrown in the same way. Thus, as Aboutorabi
notes, the Heideggarian concept of a people or culture is not based on unity through biology or
genetics.22 Rather, Being and Time affirms that a people as a unified group is formed through a
shared experience of historicity which unites all participants in a shared experience of the
present.23 This is why it is a tragedy when parents and children are separated from each other for
prolonged periods, as without the ability to develop shared experiences together, their ability to
be a heritage community together in the form of a genuine family, and share a form of
historically thrown being, is hindered.
This conception of historicity as what truly constitutes a people is one that Fanon is in
agreement with in Racism and Culture, specifically in regards to what constitutes a racial group
of people. Fanon affirms that biological and psychological studies to understand race and racism
are primitive and oversimplified endeavors that fail to recognize that the history of colonial

20
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enslavement, exploitation, and domination is the underlying foundation of what constitutes being
a native and inferiorized race.24 Fanon’s criticism here should not be taken as merely an attack
against biologists, psychologists, and evolutionists of the 20th and 19th centuries that sought to
explain race and justify the enslavement of inferior races through empirical science. This
criticism is also aimed at scientists who may attempt to ‘nobly’ explain race out of existence
through biological or psychological reductionist lenses, affirming its nonexistence based on lack
of biological differences between people of different ‘races,’ or of affirming that societal race
and racism are merely derived ‘mental quirks’ and ‘psychological flaws’ amongst people. 25
What is wrong about such arguments is that they completely ignore the historical
experience of subjugation that native people face under colonialism, which gives rise to their
collectively felt and experienced historicality of race. Such a subjugation is one that is rooted not
in crude, vulgar racism rooted in biology, but in the intents of the colonizer to continue
exploiting, dehumanizing, and subjugating colonized people for enrichment and affirmation of
cultural superiority. As Fanon notes, under the more modern practices of colonialism, such
colonial intentions continue manifesting through less crude and increasingly ‘camouflaged’
techniques that are nonetheless fundamentally the same, and thus maintain the inferioritization of
colonized people in modernity.26
A scientific study that shows that Indigenous people are genetically indistinguishable
from Whites would not end the experience of being Indigenous. Such an identity is rooted not in
a sense of being biologically Indigenous, but of having been historically thrown into the
marginalization, disadvantage, and exploitation that all the genetically and culturally distinct
ethnicities of the Indigenous diaspora face under colonialism.
24
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Some might affirm that we cannot totally dismiss biology or genetics as components that
can unite people. Aren’t people who are all collectively thrown into having a biological or
genetic disability for example, unified as a collective and distinct people by this ‘biological
experience’? This question essentially answers itself, as in such a case, it is not the mere biology
or genetics themselves that are constituting the sharedness in question. Rather, the sharedness in
question is in the felt experience itself of being thrown into the context and circumstance that
biology is forcing upon these heritage members. For example, is it in merely talking about
biological and genetic science that such people achieve a sense of collective unity? Or is it in
discussing and sharing the concrete lived experiences of marginalization and disadvantage under
such conditions and the wills to overcome such conditions that drive such individuals together as
a united people? As I acknowledge later in this paper, only those who directly experience this
thrownness have the right to answer this question with certainty, but as an outsider to this
particular historical thrownness, I am inclined to infer that it is the experience itself, and not the
biology itself, that unifies such a heritage group.
Why An Authentic Collective Group is Not The ‘They’
Such heritage communities are distinct from the ‘They’ in the sense that they still hold
distinction and uniqueness in the world. This is because, as for any heritage or historical
thrownness, be it of a gender, culture, or race, not all Dasein have been thrown into it, and as
such, it is not a mark of mere unremarkable averageness or genericness. When a group
collectively affirms such a heritage as their authentic identity, they affirm that they as a collective
group are different than the generic average of a mainstream societal they-ness, that they have a
distinct experience of the world, have distinct values in life, that their collective heritage group is
something that defies averageness, and most importantly, that this collective non-averageness
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should be empowered to speak and live for itself independently of the norms and opinions of
they-ness.
In his liberal interpretation of authenticity in Being and Time, Salem-Wiseman misses this
point in thinking that external and collective calls for how Dasein is to pursue itself necessarily
imply themselves as universal ones of a Kantian-like world conscience, one that leads to a
fallenness to they-ness.27 This is not the case at all. When one authentically supports and pursues
a collective heritage that they take as external and shared between many Dasein, they are not
affirming that to all Dasein in existence. A LGBTQ pride march, for instance, is not one that is
affirming that everyone in society should take up queerness or homosexuality. Rather, this
external call is one that is calling specifically to everyone with that distinct historical thrownness
to authentically take up this way of being, which is not a proclamation to all people on a
universal level.
The fact that such a heritage has a community of Dasein participants does not make the
heritage immune from fallen subordination into inauthenticity by the societal ‘They.’ The
conveniences and compulsions to conform to averageness that stem from the ‘They’ will still
attempt to suppress the distinct heritage and historical thrownness manifested in this community
and reduce it to a conforming unauthentic averageness. The fact that the many immigrant
heritages that entered Ellis Island were carried by masses of Dasein did not stop the
anglo-phizing of surnames, and the washing away, rather than the preserving, of the immigrant
heritages, languages, and identities that such Dasein were. The ‘They’ still attacks you even if
you are in a group. Since vulnerability to they-ness still exists, a collective heritage community
must still seek authenticity through resistance to fallenness.

27
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Necessity of Collective Authenticity
One may, of course, agree that pursuing collective authenticity is possible, but point out
that a mere possibility of doing something does not entail an obligation to do so. For what reason
should Dasein be compelled towards pursuing authenticity with others rather than simply
achieving authenticity on its own and for itself? After all, don’t we all hate group projects?
However, for a Dasein to fully revive its historical disclosure into authenticity, it must
necessarily work towards reviving the dormant historical thrownness of its fellow heritage group
members as well. Mansbach, who also interprets Being and Time as being communitarian,
affirms that “Dasein is wholly itself when the possibilities of Others become its own
possibilities, with the same end in view.”28 We must remember that it is not the individual Dasein
itself which is the true target of liberation in pursuits of authenticity. Rather, the target of
liberation is Dasein's externally derived historical thrownness itself which is manifested amongst
many people in its heritage group. For this historical thrownness itself to be fully liberated, its
revival in the entirety of that heritage group must occur. Thus, Dasein becomes capable of
authenticity at the highest level when it realizes that the true liberation of its authentic way of
being (its own possibilities) means the transformation of the world into one where all people who
are like themselves (with the same end in view) are also allowed to freely manifest their shared
historical thrownness (the possibilities that are recognized as the same as Dasein’s own and thus
become its own) in an authentic life.
Furthermore, in his discussion of the 1954 Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu against
French colonialism, Fanon demonstrates how single acts and pursuits of authenticity are never
fundamentally isolated and contained ones. He acknowledges that such a victory, where the
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Vietnamese successfully rejected and cast off the political standards of averageness and
acceptability in colonial Vietnam, and were able to authentically affirm and pursue the values
and political callings of their historically thrown experience, was one that ignited callings of
inspirational conscience and yearnings of authenticity in all other colonial subjects who also
shared that historical thrownness.29
Fanon’s note on Vietnam highlights how in pursuing authenticity, one necessarily
becomes an example of that authentic historical thrownness that inspires and lifts up the rest of
its heritage community. As Alessandrini assesses, such examples and demonstrations of
authenticity alleviate a kind of “fear barrier” which would otherwise continue sedating the rest of
one’s heritage community into inauthentic subordination to they-ness.30 It is why one experiences
a rejuvenation and feeling of being opened up when an authentic community member is
encountered, as the activity of their authenticized historically-thrown way of being kindles and
awakens the same kind of historical thrownness within ourselves. As Alessandrini notes,
authoritative regimes are aware of the risk that such collective chains of combustion pose to the
powder kegs of suppressed authenticity that they sit upon which is why such regimes try to hide,
isolate, and stomp out any initial sparks of authenticity that appear, no matter how small or
distant they may be.31
Additionally, achieving authenticity requires carving out space and allowance in the
world for one to pursue and express the uniqueness of their historical thrownness, whether that
be a part of the world that is no longer under colonial domination, a space where a religious
community can be and feel safe with their authentic selves, or a community where one can
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pursue their authentic cultural customs without being obstructed; all such openings of space are
also necessarily an opening of space to the rest of one’s heritage community. The authentication
of such heritage community members would open up even more space, and, as Fanon affirms
with respect to the authentication of colonized peoples, community members are compelled to
care about such further opening: space that is not open is space that is closed off to them– be it a
place where colonial and racial domination still lingers, a hellscape of persecution, or a
workplace of vicious male domination and privilege, this is a restriction and threat to their own
authenticity.32
Thus, all promotions and achievements of authenticity are always promotions of the
authenticized historical thrownness itself in its full and collective manifestation. Admirations
towards specific instances of authenticity are never simply towards the individual Dasein of that
instance. Rather, a considerable part of such admiration is how that instance contributes towards
an empowerment of a collectively-held historical thrownness in its totality.33
Since the apparent pursuit of one single Dasein’s authenticity is always a promotion of a
historical thrownness itself, an authentic Dasein would always be helping members of its
heritage community to develop authenticity. A Dasein cherishes moments of authenticity in all
its historical comrades when it recognizes that it can see itself and the historical thrownness that
it itself hails from in their eyes. Such a disposition towards its heritage community could explain
why an authentic Dasein would be willing to die for them. Such a martyr rests assured in the fact
that their historical thrownness, which ultimately encompasses themselves and their world as
they experience and know them, will persevere beyond them in the members of their heritage

32

Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 179-180.
One could perhaps even argue that such admiration is completely directed at the collective historical thrownness in
its entirety.
33

17
community who are instilled with that same experience of historical thrownness. Thus, a pursuit
of a collective authenticity is not only very much possible and non-contradictory, but it is also an
inevitable and necessary occurrence in full authentic becoming.
Possibility of Unity and Solidarity
It is only with such historical comrades, however, that collective authenticity can be
pursued, because if Dasein share no historical thrownness, then there is no common experience
of the world or way of life to unite their pursuits of authenticity. This is not to say that one is
necessarily opposed to or completely indifferent to the authenticity of a historic stranger. One
could indeed support the historic stranger’s achievement of authenticity through altruistic
solidarity, but such help would not be a pursuit of collective authenticity.
A cis-male, for example, could stand in solidarity with a pursuit of authenticity for
women, but this specific pursuit in itself does not open up ways of being and life that match onto
his historical thrownness. Something else in his historical thrownness that could indeed be
potentially pursued in collective authenticity, such as thrownness into a racial group, would not
be the target of the liberation at hand (assuming that this march strictly focuses on women’s
issues). He cannot stand in direct unity for them, both because it is not pursuing a liberation and
authentication of his historical thrownness, and because since it does not involve his historical
thrownness, the experience and goals that are being pursued are ones on which he cannot
rightfully claim to have insight or expertise. Only one who is part of the historical disclosure that
a collective pursuit of authenticity is focused on, whether that be of femininity, Indigenousness,
Judaism, or the working class, can claim to truly understand the experience and pursuits of
authenticity that the collective group is aimed at. Thus, such people are the only ones who can
truly conduct and lead the pursuit and achievement of their collective authenticity. A
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non-member could provide support, but only as one in an external solidarity that lets those who
are in unity with that historical thrownness lead the way to that liberation of authenticity.
Because of this, collective authenticity is not something that every single person could
unite together in pursuit of. It can only be pursued by historical comrades who share a historical
thrownness distinct from the generic averageness of they-ness. This would explain why section
74 of Being and Time affirms such destiny as “Being-with-one-another in the same world,” rather
than the world in a universal sense.34
Fanon on Intersectionality
However, Daseins are, of course, never defined by simply one definite and clear-cut
heritage of historical thrownness. Fanon recognizes this as something that some 20th century
African intellectuals, in trying to establish the existence of a unified African culture, failed to
realize in their pursuit of collective authenticity for the Black diaspora. He notes that when the
members of Black historical thrownness came together at the First Congress of the African
Society for culture in 1956, They realized that their finer and more particular experiences of
historical thrownness ultimately made them different from one another. The Blacks of Chicago,
Latin America, Nigeria, and Tanzania all realized that even though they were all Black, they
were distinct people through their distinct historically thrown cultures, which were ultimately
different collections of values, pursuits, concerns, and goals.35
Fanon agrees that the constituents of such a heritage group of a historical thrownness,
such as Blackness, are indeed always distinct from each other in other factors of historical
thrownness such as culture, sex, age/generation, etc. To suggest that this wouldn’t be the case
with the Black diaspora, and to affirm that Blacks are nothing but their race, would be just as
34
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absurd as the racism of white colonizers that proclaims Blacks and other colonial subjects to
have no culture and that all Blacks, Arabs, etc. are all ultimately the same. 36
But even with such discrepancies in a group, Fanon shows that this simply demonstrates
a presence of intersectionality with respect to historical thrownness, one that affirms that more
particular groups of Dasein, as well as individual Dasein, can and must be comrades in many
different communities and pursuits of collective authenticity in order to fully authenticize their
multilayered sets of historical thrownness. Fanon notes that while colonized nations such as
Guinea and Senegal have distinct cultural pursuits of authenticity that they must undertake on
their own in distinct groups, they nonetheless still hold a historically thrown unity and
comradeship through the same subjugation of white colonialism and exploitation in Africa that
they have experienced and must fight together against.37 Fanon simultaneously acknowledges the
presence of intersectional distinction while also affirming that it should not be used as a grounds
to undermine the dimension(s) in which people are still nonetheless united as a heritage group.
As Alessandrini highlights, Fanon realized that misleading thinking on intersectionality is what
led to the harmful division of ‘White Africa’ and ‘Black Africa,’ which led to a failure to
recognize that all parts of Africa, while certainly not sharing a homogenous Pan-African cultural
and racial unity, were nonetheless all colonized Africans that pursued a African political
authenticity against European colonialism.38 Intersectional distinction must and should be
acknowledged, but at the same time does not and ought not be taken as an obstruction to pursuits
of collective authenticity.
‘Lone Wolves’
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One may question if collective authenticity is possible if a particular experience of
historical thrownness is one that only one single Dasein has been thrown into. However, it would
seem quite rare, and perhaps even fundamentally impossible for such ‘lone wolves’ to truly exist.
After all, even if one were thrown into apparent aloneness in a certain historical disclosure,
wouldn’t they have a shared historical disclosure with others who are also all alone in their
historical disclosure? Furthermore, doesn’t the label we are using right now, ‘lone wolves,’ one
that is plural, already immediately imply in itself multiple and other people who are thrown into
that situation, and thus, a heritage community?
But even if a true lone wolf did exist, then the entirety of that specific historical
thrownness would be embedded in that Dasein, and as such, that Dasein would constitute the
entirety of the heritage community itself. Thus, any individual pursuit of this authenticity would
also ultimately be a collective one in the sense that the entirety of a heritage community would
be achieving authenticity. Furthermore, since a Dasein’s set of historical thrownness is
intersectional, it would very likely encompass a different layer of historical thrownness by which
other Dasein have been attuned. Thus, genuine lone-wolfness is at best an extreme rarity that
fails to disprove the occurrence and feasibility of collective authenticity.
Heidegger and Fanon on the Constitution of They-ness, An Incompatibility?:
I now want to give focus specifically to understanding the constitution of the ‘They.’ This
will lead to important clarifying distinctions between its particular manifestations and its
fundamental ontology, ones which might otherwise be overlooked and lead to mistakenly taking
valuable Fanonian observations on the ‘They’ as being incompatible with Being and Time.39 This
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will demonstrate both why in certain societal contexts some heritage communities can end up
facing much harder struggles for their collective authenticity through marginalization, and why
the ‘They’ itself will never actually be dismantled.
Section 27 of Being and Time affirms that if we are to ask who or where the ‘They’ is, we
cannot succeed by pointing to any particular Dasein, one’s own Dasein, to a specific group of
Dasein, nor to “the sum of them all.” With such a description of they-ness, one may perhaps
question whether Dasein have anything to do with the development of experienced they-ness at
all. The main distinction that Being and Time seems to be implying, however, is that being a
constitution of they-ness is not equivalent to you being they-ness nor of they-ness being you. I
take this as most clearly implied when he describes they-ness as that “which all are, though not
as the sum”.40 In this, Being and Time implies that this averageness is constituted through some
contribution from each Dasein (all are), and is thus not the result or reflection of any one person
or group completely. The reason why it is not a sum is because one cannot see every single
individual Dasein contributor and its participation fully reflected in that they-ness that results,
particularly because it is a blurred composite without any intra-distinction in which each
participatory contribution is diluted, and simply indistinguishable, from the contributions of
others.41
Fanon’s descriptions of the colonial system in Racism and Culture portray a much more
explicit picture of the constitution of they-ness in the context of colonized people. Fanon
describes how the authority and averageness in the colonial world were not brought about by any
kind of passive or peaceful conglomeration of Dasein that created an equal blend of native and
40
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colonizer in the averageness of colonial they-ness. Rather, the standard of colonial they-ness was
established through a bloody and violent “sacking of cultural patterns” where “a new system of
values is imposed, not proposed but affirmed, by the heavy weight of cannons and sabers.”42
Under these conditions, the native is completely subjugated and dehumanized by the domination
of the colonizing occupant, becoming “an object at the hand of the occupying nation.”43 The
native’s cultural patterns and ways of life are liquidated, lost, and outcast, not incorporated into
the standards of the colonial society. In this, the sole way of life that is seen as a ‘civilized’ and
legitimate culture is that of the white occupier’s ‘superior race.’ The colonizer, from its pedestal,
affirms that without this ‘motherhood’ of white ‘saviorism,’ colonized people would fall into a
darkness of barbarism, devoid of any culture.44 Through these colonial descriptions, it’s obvious
that Fanon is pointing a finger directly and specifically at colonizers with respect to they-ness
constitution. Does this put his decolonial thought at odds with Being and Time’s establishment of
the ‘they’ as being rooted in any specific group of Dasein? 45
‘Weak’ and ‘Strong’ Fannonian Arguments on Heritage Community Marginalization
One might try to make these seemingly contrasting views compatible by suggesting that a
weaker argument is being made in Fanon, one which permits the acknowledgement that all
Dasein contribute to the constitution of they-ness (which would make it ultimately wrong to
attribute they-ness entirely to a specific group), but which explicitly highlights that this does not
fundamentally entail each Dasein having an equal level of influence on they-ness.46 After all, it
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would be absurd to suggest that marginalized heritage communities of a societal context
contribute to the standards of averageness just as much as dominant heritage communities, such
as the capitalists, celebrities, white colonizers, binary people, or cis-males of our own societal
context. This would thus open up the possibility of considerably, but not completely, lopsided
they-nesses, one that would demonstrate why marginalized communities, in having their
historical thrownness disproportionately ostracized by they-ness, face much higher challenges in
their pursuits of collective authenticity than non-marginalized communities whose historical
thrownness, while, of course, not endorsed as the standard of averageness, is still given more
basic recognition as being a legitimate culture, gender experience, sexuality, faith, etc., by the
composite of they-ness that is faced.
The stronger argument, however, which seems to be more in line with the strong
language and descriptions Fanon puts forth, would affirm that some Dasein and heritage
communities can indeed become completely excluded from the constitution of they-ness, that
marginalizations of complete lopsidednesses can indeed occur, and that they-ness can be
attributed in its entirety to a specific group of Dasein.47 With this in mind, are we forced to retreat
to the weaker argument in order to keep Fanonian thought in line with the ontology of Being and
Time?
Particular Manifestations of They-ness as Distinct From Its Fundamental Ontology
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I would argue, however, that there is not any contradiction between the strong Fanonian
argument and the conception of they-ness presented in Being and Time. This becomes clear if
one recognizes two things. First, that understandings on the constitution of they-ness can be
directed to either how they-ness can manifest itself as a concrete particular in societal contexts,
or on what they-ness is in an ontologically fundamental and existentiale48 sense. Second, Fanon's
colonial recognitions and articulations of they-ness refer to this former type understanding, while
Being and Time is focused entirely on the latter.
The strong Fanonian argument can be completely right in recognizing how particular
societal manifestations of they-ness can be lopsided to points of complete exclusion by
dominating groups such as colonizers, and how the pursuit of collective authenticity becomes a
much more harrowing task for communities and people whose historical thrownness has been
completely denied of any basic influencing or recognition.49 But it would be wrong to suggest
from this that those dominating groups are themselves responsible for they-ness itself in a
fundamental sense, and that if a redeeming and equalizing justice is served against such
dominators, they-ness itself as an existentiale problem, as well as the recurring threat of falling
into inauthenticity, would be dismantled for Dasein. Dominators never created the existentiale of
they-ness and fallenness themselves. Rather, they simply carry out their domination through
existentiale realities already in place. It is for this reason that even for Dominators who dominate
to a brutal completeness, we always fail, as Being and Time affirms, to articulate they-ness itself
by pointing at them.50 Dasein’s being-with-others in the world, which Dasein will never be able
48
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to detach from, is what inevitably solidifies they-ness itself as a fundamental existentiale, and it
is our universal participation in that being-with-others, be it participation as complete
dominators, as pure and non-influential victims to they-ness, or as somewhere in between, that
makes the overall fundamental structure of the ‘They’ itself something “which all are.” 51
Revisions to the particular manifestation of they-ness at hand in a societal context may, of
course, lead to a less lopsided ‘They’ that ceases to disproportionately oppress the marginalized.
But a generic they-ness, be it a more just and ‘diversified’ one, will always still ultimately
remain, and as such, ultimately retain the challenge for collective authenticity.52 Political
revolutions, no matter how magnificent they become, will never become ontological revolutions
that change what Dasein is. With this, one could perhaps view us as modified versions of
Sisyphus, ones who can perhaps lessen the load of our boulders, but who will still ultimately face
an indefinite struggle of pushing them in order to possess our authenticity.
Through these undertaken distinctions, we can now see why the distinct articulations of
they-ness found in Fanon and Being and Time are indeed compatible ones that both provide
important understandings on different aspects of the constitution of they-ness. Fanon’s insights
allow a recognition of an exclusionary lopsidedness in they-nesses manifested in social contexts.
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It is one that reveals how marginalized communities, in facing much more opposition and burden
in pursuit of their authenticity, should be recognized as being in a considerably different position
than non-marginalized ones and their own less strenuous pursuits of authenticity find themselves
in. One can stand with Fanon in recognizing and fighting for these important points while also
simultaneously recognizing that Dasein will always have to face they-ness itself as a permanent
existentiale that is rooted not in any lopsided domination, but in our own ontology.
Can Dominators be Collectively Authentic?
With this feasibility of lopsided and dominated particular manifestations of they-ness in
mind, however, one may ask whether the very dominating groups, whose elevations to the
pedestal of mediocracy leads to the disproportionate oppression of marginalized heritage
communities, can be collectively authentic in their activities of domination. One may perhaps
have in mind contemporary groups that affirm their right to pursue ‘white pride.’ Similarly, one
may consider the monstrous Nazi regime that Heidegger attached himself to, one which
exclaimed to be letting ‘the pure Aryan Race’ be what they truly were as a people. 53
As a first observation, such cases entail the affirmation that the activity itself of
dominating the averageness of they-ness is a part of the alleged community’s authentic way of
being. In the case of Nazism, this would be the affirmation that the collective authenticity of
Aryans entails their establishment of themselves as a superior race that dominates the ‘They’
averageness of society, culture, and politics, and which completely exploits and liquidates all
other heritage communities to the point of mass genocide. While proponents of ‘white pride’
may claim to be fundamentally different, as Monahan discusses in his consideration of the
revivals of white-nationalism and ‘pride’ in the 2010s and 2020s, the concept of whiteness itself
is bound up in supremacy. As he discussed, whiteness was a colonially generated concept that
53

Young, Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism.

27
instilled European ethnicity and culture as the generic and vanilla standard of global averageness.
It is for this reason why white is not considered a color by our present socio-racial context, and
why non-whiteness is always considered an ‘exotic’ and ‘colored’ deviant from averageness.
Thus, a ‘prideful’ promotion of such whiteness, because of what whiteness in itself stands for,
always has an embedded appeal to maintain the hateful and biased colonial order that it is
founded upon.54 As such, such ‘pride’ is inevitably an activity of further instilling and
maintaining a domination of averageness.55
Such affirmations of authenticity by dominators demonstrate a deep obsession with either
establishing or maintaining such domination of averageness, one that signifies an inability to
conceive of or be comfortable with one’s collective authenticity as functioning without such
domination. They cannot bear the thought of ethnically/culturally European people living in a
world in which not every actor on TV looks like like them, in which the works of Van Gogh and
Chopin must stand side-by-side with non-Western works, or where beloved Western ideals of
‘liberty’ and ‘freedom,’ often in capitalistic senses, must become neighbors with the ideals of
freedom found in other nations of the world. This ironically signifies an immense fragility and
weakness in such supposedly ‘authentic’ dominators, as the only way they can supposedly be
themselves is if lopsided standards of averageness hold up their insecure senses of historical
thrownness like a crutch. It is through such obsessions and addictions with the pampering of
averageness that ‘authentic’ dominators turn out to arguably be the least authentic of them all, in
the sense that they exhibit an unwillingness to actively and independently hold up their historical
thrownness in an active and authentic way against a ‘They.’
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Strong, healthy, and genuine senses of collective authenticity would entail no such
obsessions or addictions. As such, collective authenticities such as those of Irish pride, Italian
Heritage, Southern hospitality, or Germanness, which simply aim to authenticize their heritage
communities, and hold no obsessions with dogmatically enforcing their historical thrownness as
the generic standards that all must follow, can be beautiful and unproblematic authenticities.
Fanonian Violence as Successful Deviation from ‘Idle-Talk’
As a final note on the accomplishment of collective authenticity, I will discuss how
Fanonian violence relates to Being and Time’s conception of the idle talk that chains a Dasein to
they-ness. Idle talk is one in which no actual discourse occurs, as such talk is that which has
already been ‘deposited’ and established in the common and average intelligibility of the
‘they’-ness. The notion of idle talk, however, should be understood as applying not merely to
language but to human interaction and expression overall. As Hirsch notes, it avoids ever
offending by dictating a code of conduct that appeals strictly to universal values of averageness
that have already been established.56 Such talk closes off any change or development. It closes
off the possibility of novelty, as novelty would provoke and go against the pre-established rules
that guide such conversation.57 A Dasein that idly talks participates in mere averageness, and
consequently, idle talk is a state of inauthenticity.
Fanon recognizes the concept of idle talk in affirming that the liberation of colonized
people from colonial they-ness necessarily requires them to defy and break the standards of
acceptable interactions and politics that were established by their white colonizers. He
recognizes that the evils of racism can never be overcome by appealing to and depending on the
political and cultural logic of white colonial overlords. He observes that there are many claims in
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modernity that colonizers are interested in addressing racism and granting their colonial subjects
liberty, but that such claims are fundamentally empty and deceptive.
Fanon highlights that in cases where colonial overlords ‘emancipate’ a colonial nation,
there is seldom any actual change to the economic and political systems that colonized people
live under. This is because such claims and interests are coming from a cultural and political
logic that ultimately gave rise to, and which is committed to maintaining the capitalistic
structures that maintain colonialism, exploitation, and racism. Colonial overlords are happy to
grant a colonized people ‘emancipation,’ but always on the condition that the colonized elite that
will take over abide by the implanted rules and systems of the colonizer and stay under the
thumb of its political, economic, and cultural approval.58 Such conditions continue benefiting the
colonizer’s traditions by continuing the subjugation of the ‘emancipated’ people. Haddour
highlights that such elites of the colonized are deplorably inauthentic members of the colonized
community who, rather than developing their own authentic economies and politics, embark to
get rich quick by inauthentically conforming to and adopting the politics, capitalism, and cultural
standards of their ‘previous’ colonial overlords. 59
Fanon affirms that actually liberating oneself from the domination of the colonial world
is never an agreeable and rational confrontation of viewpoints. In breaking away from the
domination of the colonizer, colonized people cannot justify themselves through the logic and
standards of the colonizer, as working through such logic and values would constrain one within
the pre-set standards of politics and capitalism that the colonized world has set as the rules for
global idle talk, within which nothing authentically distinct is genuinely expressed or brought
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about that could liberate the colonized.60 Any genuine and authentic breaking away is a
provocation that rejects the idle talk.61 Because of this, authentic acts of liberation by colonized
people will always be seen as a “enemy of values” through the politics and culture of their
colonial overlords which will ascribe evil and ‘violence’ to such genuinely decolonial politics. 62
Fanon’s observations supplement consideration of ‘idle-talk’ by showing why forms of
rebellious provocation are an inevitability for achieving the actual change necessary for
collective authenticity. Be it of a minority culture, a queer pride, or a religious faith, a collective
historical thrownness will always be limited if it restricts itself to defining and justifying itself
through the ‘proper’ logic of the acceptable averageness from which it aims to authentically
pivot. It must instead define itself independently of such restraining rules. In doing so, as Fanon
quotes, it will always come off as foriegn, strange, provocative, strange, and/or unacceptable
through the lenses of idle talk.63
As Ciccariello-Maher discusses, this act of a heritage group defining itself independently
was held by Fanon as a creation of a new human being. Fanon believed that such creation, in its
uprooting of a societal-order that once denied an oppressed people, and its provocation of the
embedded resistance from those who seek to maintain their privilege under the status quo, would
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inevitably be a violent one.64 This ‘violence’ that is spoken of, however, is widely
encompassing, and often encompasses acts of resistance that, while often countered by
authorities in the same brutal way that violence is responded to, might not be considered violence
at all by those who are in unity or solidarity with the heritage group. Ciccariello-Maher notes that
even acts of simply appearing in public, such as the black-youth led flash mob phenomena in
Philadelphia, which provoked the curfew and public-gathering laws that authorities had set
against their commitment to demonstrate against racial injustice, are already held and treated in
themselves as violent, anarchic, uncivil, and unacceptable behaviors by authorities, and are
brutally responded to as such.65 With this, one can recognize many other examples, such as the
‘disgusting’ taboo that authentic queer public displays of affection may evoke amongst societies
of heterosexual standards, or the unacceptable incivility of those who provokingly defy dress
codes or standards, which would also ultimately acts of violently provoking the established idle
talk of the ‘They” status-quo. Heritage groups must have the courage and tenacity to face this
state of being a provoker, one which the flourishing of their authenticity necessarily brings about.
Conclusion
Reflecting on Heidegger’s Being and Time and the works of Fanon, this paper has
demonstrated historical thrownness as the main focus of authenticity, and through this, the
feasibility and necessity of pursuing authenticity collectively. In considering the constitution of
they-ness, it has also recognized how certain communities can become much more marginalized
than others, and due to this, face much more harrowing challenges in their striving for
authenticity. Finally, in relating Fanon’s thought to Being and Time’s idle talk, provocation was
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recognized as an inevitability of genuine achievements of collective authenticity. With this, one
ought to recognize that freeing ourselves to pursue our own authentic callings is an activity that
requires us to march hand in hand with our fellow heritage comrades. The full accomplishment
of such, be it oftentimes a difficult and provocative one, is what will allow a historical
thrownness to shine and project itself to its full authentic magnificence.

Bibliography
Aboutorabi, Rozita. “Heidegger, Education, Nation and Race.” Policy Futures in Education 13,
no. 4 (2015): 415-423. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478210315571219.
Alessandrini, Anthony C. “‘Any Decolonization Is a Success’: Fanon and the African Spring”, in
Frantz Fanon and the Future of Cultural Politics, 163-188. London, UK: Lexington
Books, 2014.
Cameron, W. S. K. .“Martin Heidegger: Individual and Collective Responsibility.” In Engaging
Nature: Environmentalism and the Political Theory Canon, edited by Peter F. Cannavò
and Joseph H. Lane, 239–52. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1287j06.18.
de Warren, Nicolas. “The Apocalypse of Hope: Political Violence in the Writings of Sartre and
Fanon.” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 27, no. 1 (2006): 25-59.
https://doi-org.electra.lmu.edu/10.5840/gfpj200627118.
Dostal, Robert J. “The Public and the People: Heidegger’s Illiberal Politics.” The Review of
Metaphysics 47, no. 3 (1994): 517–55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20129531.
Egan, David. “Das Man and Distantiality in Being and Time” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary
Journal of Philosophy 55, no. 3 (2012): 289-306,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2012.678606.
Fanon, Frantz. “Racism and Culture.” Translated by Haakon Chevalier. In I Am Because We Are:
Readings In Africana Philosophy, edited by Fred L. Hord and Jonathan S. Lee, 206-216.
Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2016.
–. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York, NY: Grove Press, 2004.

33
Gordon, Lewis R., George Ciccariello-Maher, and Nelson Maldonado-Torres. “Frantz Fanon,
Fifty Years on: A Memorial Roundtable.” Radical Philosophy Review 16 no.1 (2013):
307-324. https://doi.org/10.5840/radphilrev201316125.
Haddour, Azzedine. “The Wretched of the Earth: the anthem of decolonization?” In Frantz
Fanon, postcolonialism and the ethics of difference. Manchester, UK: Manchester
University Press, 2019.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John MacQuarrie and Edward S. Robinson.
Victoria, UK: Must Have Books, 2021.
Hirsch, Elisabeth F. “The Problem of Speech in 'Being and Time'.” In Heidegger's Existential
Analytic, edited by F. Elliston, 159-178. The Hague, NL: Mouton Publishers, 1978.
Mansbach, Abraham. “Heidegger on the Self, Authenticity and Inauthenticity.” Iyyun: The
Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 40, no.1 (1991): 65-91.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23350704.
McMullin, Irene. Time and The Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations. Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 2013.
Monahan, Michael J. “Racism and “Self-Love”: The Case of White Nationalism.” Critical
Philosophy of Race 9 no.1 (2021): 1-15. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/777467.
Salem-Wiseman, Jonathan. “Heidegger’s Dasein and the Liberal Conception of the Self.”
Political Theory 31, no. 4 (2003): 533-557. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591703251146.
Young, Julian. Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1997.

